Beyond Compliance: How KORE Is Preparing for DORA and Strengthening Digital Operational Resilience

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Beyond Compliance: How KORE Is Preparing for DORA and Strengthening Digital Operational Resilience
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The Digital Operational Resilience Act is changing how Europe's financial sector manages technology risk and evaluates the organisations on which it depends. For cloud infrastructure providers, the implications extend beyond regulation into the design, operation and governance of critical digital services. At KORE Cloud Solutions, these developments are helping shape our infrastructure strategy and the evolution of our integrated Business Management System.

The modern financial sector depends on a complex network of technology services that extends far beyond the boundaries of individual banks, investment firms and other regulated institutions. Cloud platforms, telecommunications networks, data centres, software applications and specialist ICT providers have become essential components of financial operations, supporting everything from customer transactions and internal communications to data processing and regulatory reporting.

This dependence has created a challenge for regulators and financial institutions alike. Although organisations may maintain extensive internal security controls and risk management procedures, their ability to operate can be affected by failures within external technology providers. A disruption involving a telecommunications carrier, cloud platform or shared software service can affect multiple organisations simultaneously, potentially creating consequences that extend across the wider financial system.

The European Union's Digital Operational Resilience Act, commonly known as DORA, was introduced to address these concerns. Applicable since 17 January 2025, the regulation establishes a harmonised framework for strengthening the ability of regulated financial entities to withstand, respond to and recover from ICT-related disruptions. Its scope extends across ICT risk management, incident handling and reporting, operational resilience testing, third-party risk management and related governance responsibilities.

For organisations providing cloud infrastructure and associated ICT services, DORA is an important development even where its requirements do not apply directly in the same manner as they do to regulated financial institutions. Customers operating within the financial sector increasingly need evidence that their technology providers understand operational risks, maintain effective resilience arrangements and can supply the information necessary to support regulatory compliance.

At KORE Cloud Solutions, we see these developments as part of a broader shift in how infrastructure services are evaluated. Security and availability remain fundamental, but customers also need confidence that providers understand their dependencies, manage disruptions effectively and can demonstrate that their operational controls work as intended. This perspective is influencing our ongoing infrastructure development, operational improvement programme and plans for an integrated Business Management System.

Understanding DORA's Implications for KORE

DORA establishes obligations primarily for financial entities falling within its regulatory scope, while also creating a European oversight framework for ICT third-party service providers formally designated as critical. The distinction is important because providing cloud services to a regulated organisation does not automatically make a technology provider directly subject to every requirement imposed on that customer, nor does it automatically place the provider within the critical third-party oversight regime.

KORE is therefore approaching DORA through an assessment of the responsibilities relevant to our role as an ICT infrastructure provider. Our objective is to understand the requirements that may affect us through customer relationships, contractual commitments and applicable regulatory arrangements, while strengthening our own operational practices in areas that contribute to digital resilience.

This is particularly relevant where customers rely on external ICT services to support critical or important business functions. Such arrangements can involve detailed contractual expectations concerning service descriptions, availability, security, incident notification, business continuity, subcontracting, audit rights and termination or exit provisions. The precise requirements depend on the nature of the service and the applicable contractual and regulatory context, but they place increasing importance on the provider's ability to supply accurate information and demonstrate effective operational controls.

For KORE, this means considering how our infrastructure services are documented, how dependencies are identified and how assurance information can be maintained consistently. It also means ensuring that our internal management arrangements can support appropriate customer due diligence without requiring every assessment to begin as a separate exercise in collecting information from across the organisation.

We do not regard DORA as a conventional certification scheme, and we are not presenting our current work as a completed regulatory compliance assessment. Instead, we are using the framework to inform the development of our operational capabilities and the management processes needed to support customers operating in increasingly demanding regulatory environments.

Building on Our Existing Management Framework

KORE has achieved certification to ISO/IEC 27001:2022 for our established information security management system, providing a foundation for managing security risks through documented policies, operational controls, responsibilities and continual improvement. This framework already addresses many disciplines relevant to operational resilience, including asset management, access control, supplier relationships, incident management and the protection of information.

However, information security and digital operational resilience are not identical. An infrastructure environment can be appropriately protected against unauthorised access while remaining vulnerable to disruption caused by hardware failures, telecommunications outages, software defects or dependencies on external suppliers. Similarly, an organisation may have effective backup arrangements without having demonstrated that its wider business processes can continue during a prolonged incident.

DORA places significant emphasis on the ability of organisations to maintain and restore their operational capabilities, making it necessary to consider technology, people, processes and external dependencies together. For a cloud infrastructure provider, this requires an understanding not only of individual systems but also of the relationships between those systems and the services they support.

Our existing ISO 27001 framework provides a useful starting point, but we are developing a broader approach through the proposed implementation of an integrated Business Management System. This initiative is intended to bring together our established information security arrangements, our plans for business continuity management under ISO 22301 and our longer-term ambitions for AI governance under ISO/IEC 42001. DORA-related requirements will be considered within the same framework, particularly where they influence customer expectations and the management of ICT third-party risk.

The advantage of this approach is that many governance activities can be coordinated without losing the specific requirements associated with individual standards or regulations. Risk management, document control, internal auditing, corrective action and management review are relevant across several disciplines, while the technical and operational controls required to address particular risks can be maintained within their appropriate context.

Our intention is to create a management system that reflects how KORE operates rather than simply accumulating separate collections of compliance documentation.

Developing a More Connected Business Management System

One of the challenges facing organisations with formal management systems is maintaining a clear relationship between written procedures and the technical activities those procedures are intended to govern. Policies may describe how infrastructure should be monitored, how changes should be approved or how incidents should be investigated, while the supporting evidence is distributed across monitoring applications, ticketing systems, configuration repositories and operational records.

This fragmentation can make it difficult to demonstrate how management requirements are implemented in practice, particularly when customers or auditors require information covering several operational areas.

As part of our BMS development, we are reviewing how documentation, risks, operational assets, suppliers and supporting evidence can be organised into a more coherent structure. Our existing management documentation has been maintained through SharePoint, but we are exploring whether structured Markdown documentation, version-controlled repositories and linked management records could provide improved traceability and flexibility.

The objective is not simply to replace one document platform with another. We want to establish a framework in which relevant information can be maintained consistently and connected to the operational processes it supports. A business continuity procedure, for example, should be associated with the services it protects, the infrastructure on which those services depend, the individuals responsible for recovery and the evidence generated during testing.

Similarly, a supplier risk assessment should be linked to the relevant contractual arrangements, operational dependencies and contingency measures. Where a supplier supports several services or locations, that relationship should be visible so that the potential consequences of a disruption can be assessed appropriately.

These capabilities are particularly relevant to DORA because financial institutions must understand the ICT services on which they depend and the risks associated with their third-party arrangements. By maintaining accurate, structured information within our own management framework, we aim to make it easier to support customer assurance activities while preserving appropriate confidentiality and access controls.

Understanding the Technical Standards Supporting DORA

The main DORA regulation is supported by Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical Standards, commonly referred to as RTS and ITS. These measures provide additional detail concerning particular regulatory requirements, including aspects of ICT risk management, incident reporting, contractual arrangements and information registers.

KORE has already begun examining these supporting standards as part of our wider compliance planning. This work is intended to help identify which requirements are relevant to our services and how they may influence the information and assurance expected by regulated customers.

One important example concerns the Register of Information that financial entities are required to maintain in relation to their contractual arrangements with ICT third-party service providers. The register supports regulatory understanding of ICT dependencies and the relationships between financial institutions and external technology providers.

Although responsibility for maintaining and submitting the register belongs to the relevant financial entity, providers such as KORE may be asked to supply information needed to ensure that the records are accurate. Depending on the arrangement, this can include legal entity information, descriptions of services, delivery locations, contractual details and relevant subcontracting relationships.

Our proposed BMS provides an opportunity to establish more consistent records of this information, reducing the need to reconstruct it whenever a customer requests an assessment or regulatory disclosure.

The same approach can support contractual due diligence and supplier assurance. Rather than treating every request as an isolated administrative exercise, we want to maintain verified information that can be reviewed, updated and provided to authorised parties when appropriate.

This work remains at a planning and development stage, and further assessment will be necessary to determine how the detailed requirements apply to particular customer relationships and services.

Strengthening Resilience Across Our Infrastructure

Operational resilience depends on the design and behaviour of the infrastructure itself. Documentation and management procedures are essential, but they cannot compensate for technical arrangements that have not been adequately designed, maintained or tested.

KORE operates infrastructure in Sofia and Frankfurt and is developing additional capabilities in London Enfield. These locations form part of our broader strategy for delivering cloud infrastructure, virtualisation, connectivity, backup and associated services.

Operating across multiple locations provides opportunities to improve availability and recovery, but it also introduces additional dependencies. Different sites may rely on separate telecommunications carriers, data centre facilities, routing arrangements and supporting services, while certain management or operational functions may remain shared across locations.

Understanding these relationships is essential when assessing the consequences of a failure. A redundant network connection may provide limited protection if both circuits depend on the same physical route, while geographically separated systems may still share dependencies involving authentication, DNS, management access or external suppliers.

Our ongoing infrastructure development programme therefore includes work on network architecture, routing consistency, redundant connectivity and controlled failover mechanisms. In London Enfield, this includes the development of redundant switching and routing arrangements, multiple connectivity services and an infrastructure design intended to support predictable operational behaviour during component failures.

We are also working towards greater consistency in network management across Sofia, Frankfurt and Enfield, including the standardisation of routing approaches and the documentation of how traffic moves between locations.

These improvements are important because resilience is not simply the presence of redundant equipment. It is the demonstrated ability of a service to continue operating, or recover within acceptable limits, when particular components become unavailable.

Our longer-term objective is to connect infrastructure design with formal dependency analysis, risk assessment and repeatable resilience testing so that operational claims can be supported by evidence rather than assumptions.

Monitoring, Security Assessment and Operational Awareness

A resilient infrastructure environment requires effective visibility into its operational state. Without reliable monitoring, organisations may be unable to identify developing problems, distinguish expected behaviour from genuine incidents or determine the scope of a disruption.

KORE uses a range of monitoring and security assessment technologies, including LibreNMS for network monitoring, Zabbix for infrastructure and service monitoring, and Greenbone/OpenVAS for vulnerability assessment. These systems provide complementary information about network conditions, system availability, performance and potential security weaknesses.

During our recent operational improvement work, we have been reviewing monitoring coverage, alerting arrangements and vulnerability assessment processes across our infrastructure locations. This includes improving consistency between sites and refining how operational events are classified and communicated.

An important part of this work concerns alert quality. Infrastructure environments routinely experience temporary changes in utilisation as a result of scheduled backups, replication activities and other expected workloads. If monitoring systems generate excessive notifications for these events, genuinely important incidents can become more difficult to identify.

Our approach is therefore to improve the relationship between monitoring thresholds, historical behaviour and the operational significance of an event. Sustained abnormal utilisation accompanied by packet loss or interface errors may require investigation, whereas a brief increase associated with a known backup schedule may represent normal operation.

Vulnerability management is another important component of this work. We have been developing more consistent scanning arrangements and reporting processes, with the intention of improving visibility into security weaknesses and supporting structured remediation activities.

These systems also provide a source of operational evidence that can contribute to our wider management framework. Monitoring results, vulnerability assessments, incident records and corrective actions should ultimately support risk management and continual improvement rather than remaining disconnected technical outputs.

Incident Management and Customer Communication

DORA places considerable emphasis on the identification, classification and reporting of ICT-related incidents. For regulated financial entities, the framework establishes specific obligations concerning major incidents and associated reporting arrangements.

For an ICT service provider, the practical requirement is to maintain effective incident management processes and support customers with accurate information where contractual or regulatory responsibilities make that necessary.

A meaningful incident record should establish the sequence of events, identify affected services, document the actions taken and distinguish confirmed findings from preliminary interpretations. During the early stages of an incident, the root cause may not be known, and it is important that communications reflect the available evidence rather than presenting assumptions as established facts.

As part of our BMS development, we intend to examine how incident records, escalation procedures, customer notifications and technical evidence can be managed more consistently. This includes considering how incidents should be categorised, how responsibilities are assigned and how contractual notification requirements are identified.

The distinction between provider responsibilities and customer regulatory obligations is important. A financial institution may be required to submit regulatory reports within particular timeframes, while its technology provider may be subject to separate notification requirements established through contractual arrangements. These obligations must be understood and coordinated appropriately.

Our objective is to support clear communication and reliable investigation while maintaining the information necessary for subsequent review and corrective action.

Business Continuity and the Role of ISO 22301

One of the most significant elements of our wider resilience strategy is the planned implementation of a Business Continuity Management System aligned with ISO 22301.

Although business continuity and disaster recovery are closely related, they address different aspects of organisational resilience. Disaster recovery generally concentrates on restoring technology systems and data following a disruptive event, while business continuity considers how essential activities can be maintained through disruption, including the people, processes, suppliers and communications required to continue operating.

For a cloud infrastructure provider, both are important. Restoring a virtualisation cluster may be technically successful, but the wider recovery process may still be inadequate if customer communications fail, responsibilities are unclear or supporting dependencies remain unavailable.

Our ISO 22301 ambitions are intended to introduce a more formal approach to business impact analysis, continuity planning, recovery objectives, exercises and management review. This will help us connect the technical capabilities of our infrastructure with the wider organisational processes required to maintain services during disruption.

KORE already provides backup-related services and operates infrastructure designed to support availability and recovery. However, the existence of backups does not automatically demonstrate that a service can be restored within a particular timeframe, nor does technical redundancy guarantee continuity under every failure scenario.

A mature continuity framework must examine recovery time objectives, recovery point objectives, service dependencies and the practical effectiveness of restoration procedures. These considerations are particularly relevant where customers operate under demanding availability requirements or rely on ICT services to support critical business functions.

We intend to develop stronger evidence of resilience through documented testing, review of results and corrective action where weaknesses are identified. This work will support our wider operational objectives while also helping us respond to appropriate customer assurance requirements associated with DORA.

Managing Suppliers and External Dependencies

Modern cloud infrastructure depends on a network of external organisations, including data centre operators, telecommunications carriers, hardware manufacturers, software vendors and specialist service providers. These relationships are essential to service delivery, but they also introduce risks that must be understood and managed.

DORA places particular emphasis on ICT third-party risk because disruption within a supplier can affect the operational resilience of a regulated financial institution. For KORE, this reinforces the importance of maintaining accurate information about our own suppliers and understanding the services and locations that depend on them.

Our proposed BMS will need to accommodate supplier classification, dependency mapping, contractual information and relevant assurance records. Where subcontractors contribute to services supporting critical or important functions, customers may require additional information about those arrangements and the controls used to manage associated risks.

We also intend to consider concentration risk, particularly where multiple services depend on a common facility, telecommunications provider or technology platform. Such dependencies may not be immediately apparent when individual services are assessed in isolation, but they can become significant during a wider disruption.

The objective is not to eliminate every external dependency, which would be unrealistic for any infrastructure provider. It is to understand those dependencies, assess their potential consequences and establish appropriate mitigation and contingency arrangements.

Demonstrating Resilience Through Testing

One of the central lessons of operational resilience engineering is that systems must be tested under realistic conditions. A configuration may appear correct, and redundant components may be present, but the effectiveness of those arrangements cannot be established solely through documentation.

KORE's infrastructure development programme already includes consideration of practical failure scenarios involving network connectivity, switching, routing, virtualisation hosts and supporting services. We intend to develop these activities into a more consistent approach to resilience testing, supported by documented objectives, expected outcomes, observed results and corrective actions.

This will help us understand how infrastructure behaves when components become unavailable and whether recovery mechanisms operate within acceptable limits. It will also provide opportunities to identify less obvious dependencies, such as management connectivity, DNS availability or the accessibility of monitoring systems during an incident.

Testing does not always require deliberately disrupting production services. Depending on the risks involved, appropriate methods may include controlled failover exercises, configuration reviews, tabletop scenarios and recovery simulations.

DORA also establishes particular resilience testing obligations for financial entities, including advanced testing arrangements for certain organisations. These requirements should not be confused with a general obligation for every ICT provider to undertake the same regulatory testing programme.

Our focus is on developing testing practices appropriate to our services and operational risks while supporting customer assurance requirements where relevant and contractually agreed.

The Relationship Between DORA and Our AI Development Programme

KORE is also exploring the potential for artificial intelligence to support infrastructure operations through our internal KLabs development programme. Projects involving infrastructure information, security analysis, orchestration and operational assistance may eventually help engineers investigate incidents more efficiently and make better use of information distributed across monitoring and management systems.

For example, an AI-assisted investigation could potentially correlate a network alert with configuration information, identify relevant infrastructure dependencies and present engineers with a structured assessment of possible causes.

However, intelligent automation must itself be treated as an operational dependency and potential source of risk. A model may misinterpret information, produce an incorrect recommendation or behave unexpectedly when connected to external tools.

Our approach therefore places emphasis on separating analytical capabilities from operational authority, enforcing permissions through trusted application components and introducing automation progressively.

This work connects with our ambitions for ISO/IEC 42001, which provides a management framework for responsible AI development and use. Although DORA and ISO/IEC 42001 address different concerns, both reinforce the importance of understanding technology risks and establishing effective controls.

We intend to ensure that AI-assisted operations strengthen resilience rather than introduce unmanaged complexity or compromise established security and change-management procedures.

The Road Ahead

Our DORA-related work forms part of a broader programme to strengthen KORE's operational management and develop an integrated Business Management System. The initial priority is to understand the requirements relevant to our role as an ICT provider and identify how those requirements relate to our services, customer relationships and contractual responsibilities.

The RTS and ITS material already gathered provides a useful starting point, but further analysis will be required to distinguish obligations applying directly to regulated financial entities from those that may affect KORE through customer relationships or specific regulatory circumstances.

We then intend to map the relevant requirements against our existing management framework and operational capabilities. Our ISO 27001 system provides an established foundation, while the planned ISO 22301 programme will address additional business continuity and resilience requirements. The wider BMS will provide a structure for maintaining the associated documentation, responsibilities, risks and evidence.

As this framework develops, attention will turn to strengthening supplier information, incident management, continuity planning, resilience testing and customer assurance processes. These arrangements will need to be evaluated through practical operation, internal review and corrective action rather than being treated as complete once documentation has been written.

We have not established a public completion date or claimed that our current programme represents a completed DORA compliance assessment. Our intention is to develop the relevant capabilities progressively and assess their effectiveness against clearly defined requirements.

For customers, the value of this work should ultimately be reflected in greater transparency, more consistent operational practices and improved confidence in the services on which they depend. Regulated financial organisations may benefit from clearer supplier information and more structured assurance processes, while customers outside the financial sector can benefit from the same improvements in monitoring, incident management and resilience.

Digital operational resilience is not simply a regulatory obligation or an exercise in producing compliance documentation. It is an organisational capability that depends on the interaction between infrastructure, people, processes, suppliers and management decisions.

At KORE Cloud Solutions, our objective is to continue strengthening those foundations as our services and infrastructure develop. By combining established information security management with formal business continuity planning, improved operational evidence and a more integrated governance framework, we aim to build an organisation that is better equipped to anticipate disruption, respond effectively and support the changing requirements of our customers.

DORA provides an important perspective on that journey, but the underlying objective extends beyond any single regulation. We want our infrastructure and services to be demonstrably secure, resilient and responsibly managed, with operational practices that reflect the importance of the systems our customers entrust to us.

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